|
History 122 Document The Gulf of Tonkin Incident |
[click
to enlarge] |
|
At the time it was known by the Defense Department (and probably the White House) that South Vietnamese commandos and U.S. "advisors" had been engaged in attacks against North Vietnamese military facilities in the Gulf of Tonkin, including radar installations on the Island of Hon Nieu, as early as July 31 and on the nights of August 2-4.[1] So, while the Maddox was in international waters and in the area only for intelligence purposes, the North Vietnamese may have logically concluded that it was involved in the commando raids.[2] As for the second attack alleged to have taken place on August 4, it did not. The ship fired on imaginary enemy gunboats attributed to an "overeager sonarman." As a result of the real attack on the Maddox and the alleged attack on the Turner Joy, the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga launched attacks on North Vietnamese boats naval bases in the area. It was later revealed that the NSA misread North Vietnamese intercepts and then covered up the mistake by altering documents in order to make it appear as though there really was a second attack on August 4. On the evening of August 4, President Johnson addressed the nation on the incident. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara then went before Congress to testify. He denied that the U.S. Navy was supporting military operations in the area, and he characterized the gunboat attacks as "unprovoked." He also claimed that there was "unequivocal proof" of a second attack. As a result of President Johnson's request and McNamara's testimony, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7 by a vote of 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate. Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, U.S. involvement in the war escalated rapidly. It had begun with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954, which led to several hundred military advisors sent by President Dwight Eisenhower. By 1962 the number of CIA and Army "advisors" had grown to 12,000. In the words of President John F. Kennedy, Vietnam was "the finger in the dike" against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. By the end of 1965 there were 180,000 Americans serving in South Vietnam under the command of General William Westmoreland. U.S. troop strength in Vietnam rose to nearly 400,000 in 1967, but despite their superior weapons, the Americans could not defeat the skillful and determined insurgents. On January 30, 1968, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched a massive surprise offensive during the Vietnamese Tet (lunar new year) festival, attacking 36 South Vietnamese cities and towns including Saigon. Westmoreland requested more troops in order to widen the war after the Tet Offensive, but the shifting balance of American public opinion now favored de-escalation of the conflict.[3] On March 31, 1968, Johnson announced in a television address that bombing north of the 20th parallel would be stopped and that he would not seek another term as president. When Johnson left the White House in 1969 there were approximately 540,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in South Vietnam. President Richard M. Nixon began the drawdown of American ground troops ("Vietnamization" of the war), and simultaneous escalated air attacks, pressuring the North Vietnamese for a truce. In 1973 Nixon announced an agreement with Vietnamese negotiators for "peace with honor" and promptly withdrew all remaining U.S. forces.[4] Essentially it had been a civil war in which the U.S. supported its anti-communist client against a communist adversary backed by the Soviet Union and China. Neither the Americans nor the Soviets really cared much about the Vietnamese, and neither side wanted Vietnam to escalate into a major war, but neither wanted to see their client lose because of the broader implications, so the war was prolonged--yet fairly well contained (with minor incursions into Laos and Cambodia). Johnson had been reluctant to deepen American involvement in Vietnam, but faced by the crumbling South Vietnamese regime in Saigon and a determination to not be "the first American president to lose a foreign war," he felt he had no alternative. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident gave him the legitimacy he needed to "pound the enemy into submission." But the North Vietnamese were determined to win. To achieve their goal of unifying the country under communist control, they were prepared to accept unlimited losses, for as long as it took, to wear down and finally break the will of the U.S. government to continue the war. With the emergence of an era of détente, facilitated by his historic visits to China and Russia in 1972, and pressured by both a sagging economy and an increasingly impatient public that had grown disillusioned and embittered, President Nixon accepted the reality that the fate of Vietnam was no longer vital to U.S. interests (if it ever was). In 1973 the "finger in the dike" was removed, and in 1975 the domino fell. © 2006 David C. Hanson, Virginia Western Community College [1] A highly classified program of
covert attacks against North Vietnam had been initiated by the CIA
in 1961. The program was transferred to the Defense Department
in 1964, and U.S. Navy Seals were assisting the South Vietnamese at
the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. [3] In a familiar refrain, General Westmoreland claimed in his memoirs that President Johnson escalated the war too slowly, did not provide enough troops, did not adequately support the South Vietnamese government, and failed to level with the American public. He also criticized Nixon for abandoning the South Vietnamese, and he blamed U.S. television networks and newspapers for turning the country against the war. All of the self-serving finger-pointing fails to acknowledge the cold reality of the situation: the U.S. suffered approximately 350,000 casualties in Vietnam (47,000 killed in action, 11,000 non-combat deaths, and 290,000 wounded); an estimated 1 million North Vietnamese and Vietcong combatants were killed, another 3 million were wounded, and perhaps as many as 4 million civilians were casualties of the war (a total of 8 million casualties). Years later, General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of communist forces in Vietnam, claimed that they would have continued fighting "another twenty years, maybe a hundred years, as long as it took to win, regardless of cost." [4] Secret negotiations in Paris between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho began on February 21, 1970. On October 7, 1970, Nixon unveiled his plan for ending the war in a televised address to the nation, implying that peace was near; but this premature announcement was merely to placate the American public on the eve of the November Congressional elections. The obstacle was the refusal of the North Vietnamese to accept an agreement that left the government of General Nguyen Van Thieu in power in South Vietnam. Two years later (October 8, 1972), a cease-fire agreement was reached (just in time for Nixon's election to a second term in November), but the talks dragged on as Thieu refused to accept the proposal because it did not require the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from his country or guarantee the security of his regime. Nixon increased the pressure on both Thieu and the Communists. He sent an ultimatum to North Vietnam on December 14, 1972, and four days later he unleashed a new wave of bombing. (American aircraft flew 3,000 sorties over the next eleven days, dropping 40,000 tons of bombs in the most intense air offensive of the war. The North Vietnamese fired 1,200 surface-to-air missiles and shot down twenty-six U.S. aircraft.) Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed their meetings on January 8, 1973, and resolved their differences the next day. Essentially the same agreement as had been on the table in October was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973: a cease-fire, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and release of prisoners, with political issues left to be resolved by a "council of national reconciliation" (in effect, leaving it to the Vietnamese to settle their differences peacefully). The last U.S. troops left Vietnam in March 1973. The war resumed in January 1974. Saigon fell on March 25, 1975. |
