Eyeball the Eyeball: the Cuban Missile Crisis David C. Hanson, Virginia Western Community College
In September of 1962 the Soviet Union secretly began building missile sites in Cuba. On October 14 an American U-2 flight photographed the missile sites. President John F. Kennedy was briefed on October 16 and he quickly assembled an ad hoc group of advisors to consider U.S. options. On October 22, on national television, Kennedy demanded the removal of Soviet missiles and declared that a nuclear missile strike from Cuba would result in "a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." Two days later the U.S. deployed a naval task force of nineteen ships to prevent missiles from entering Cuba. Kennedy threatened to sink any ship interfering with the "quarantine" of Cuba. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ordered Soviet strategic forces to full alert and threatened to sink any vessel interfering with Soviet ships en route to Cuba. Kennedy and Khrushchev were "eyeball to eyeball" at the brink of nuclear war. A series of communications between Kennedy and the Soviet Premier took place during the week through various channels, culminating in Khrushchev’s promise to remove the missiles by the October 28 deadline. That, essentially, is the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
For obvious reasons, the Cuban Missile Crisis has become one of the most fascinating chapters in American diplomatic history. There is great drama, a hero and a villain, and a happy ending. Beneath the surface, however, the episode reveals a great deal about Cold War mythology. Several disturbing questions were raised at the time and they continue to deserve our consideration, even now that the Cold War has ended, because "weapons of mass destruction" continue to shape the direction of American foreign policy.
Why did Khrushchev try to sneak intermediate range surface-to-surface missiles into Cuba? Clearly this was a bold and risky move which would upset the Cold War status quo. What were his objectives, and what made him think he could get away with it? There are several possible explanations, all stemming from the obvious point that it would have given the Soviets a stronger position for pushing their foreign policy agenda.
At the heart of this agenda was Russian national security (a point which is often overlooked), not "world domination." The U.S. had a substantial superiority in nuclear strike capability throughout the Cold War, but the imbalance was especially acute in the early 1960s. (Ironically, Kennedy had claimed in the 1960 Presidential election that there was a "missile gap" favoring the Soviets!) Evidence suggests that Khrushchev hoped to quietly install the missiles in Cuba in order to use them as leverage to gain any or all of the following objectives: (1) to force the U.S. out of Berlin; (2) to get U.S. Jupiter missiles out of Turkey; (3) to bargain for a nuclear freeze and nonproliferation treaty [aimed primarily at China]; and, lastly, to protect its Cuban ally from a U.S. invasion.
There is more to the question of what caused the Cuban Missile Crisis than mere speculation about Khrushchev’s motives. First, there is the fact that, through covert operations begun in 1959, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been actively trying to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. Ever since the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, hard-liners in Congress had been calling for a full-blown invasion of Cuba. With Congressional elections in November, Cuba was a hot topic in American politics. [Various plots to assassinate Casto were hatched by the CIA before and after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose in November 1961 with the objective of toppling Castro. Ironically, of the three leaders at the center of the crisis, it was only Castro who survived the cold war.]
There is also the fact that the Soviets were threatening to squeeze the U.S. out of Berlin--an actual as well as symbolic "hole in the iron curtain"--through a peace treaty with East Germany. During the 1961 summit meeting in Vienna, Khrushchev referred to Berlin as "the bone in my throat." He insisted that the problem must be settled within the year. Kennedy had come across like a lightweight who was badly outmatched, and shortly after the Vienna summit, the Soviets built the Berlin Wall. Kennedy protested, but the wall stayed up until the end of the cold war. This added to Khrushchev’s confidence and Kennedy’s determination not to appear weak in a crisis.
How serious was the crisis? The most serious point seems to have been October 24-27, when U.S. and Soviet strategic forces were on "red alert" [missile sites cocked for firing, submarines deployed, bombers loaded with H-bombs flying into position].* An American air strike against the missile sites, to be followed by an invasion of Cuba, had been ordered to begin if Khrushchev did not agree to remove the missiles from Cuba by the October 28 deadline. Clearly neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted nuclear war, but both seemed to be dangerously close to starting one. A logical scenario is that once the U.S. attacked Cuba, the Soviets would respond by hitting the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey; then in accordance with NATO obligations, U.S. missiles in Europe would hit the Soviet missile sites that attacked U.S. bases in Turkey, prompting a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile strike against the United States.
Was Kennedy's tough public stance really necessary? Since the Soviet missiles would have had little impact on U.S. strategic superiority, their continued presence would have been mostly symbolic; but it is safe to say that it was a political imperative for Kennedy to get them out. Republicans would have swept the November elections and probably regained the White House in 1964. Moreover, U.S. credibility as the backbone of NATO would have been seriously weakened.**
Soviet missiles were promptly removed from Cuba; in return, Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. Privately, through secret talks between Attorney-General Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, he also agreed to Khrushchev’s demand that he pull the U.S. Jupiter missiles out of Turkey (they were obsolete anyway). The Soviets let up their pressure for Berlin; and a test-ban treaty was signed in 1963, but the nuclear arms race escalated. One could say the crisis ended in a draw. Nonetheless, appearances matter a lot in high stakes diplomacy (also domestic politics), and Kennedy seemed to have backed down his rival. Khrushchev’s power slowly began to decline, and he was toppled by a political coup in October of 1964. Meanwhile, Kennedy’s stature at home and abroad soared.
The question remains, what lesson should be learned from this high-stakes game of "chicken?" Did the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrate that whichever side has superior firepower and courage will prevail in a showdown? In the final analysis, was Kennedy wise and skillful in his use of brinkmanship--or lucky? Having led the nation to the brink of nuclear war, Kennedy seemed to grasp the most important lesson from the Cuban Missile Crisis. Speaking at American University’s commencement in June of 1963, he urged a shift from the traditional cold war approach of Soviet-American competition and confrontation to a new era of cooperation. We should pursue a strategy of peace, not "a strategy of annihilation." Kennedy stressed, "Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either a humiliating defeat or a nuclear war." Five months later he was assassinated.
*On October 24 the confrontation seemed to be slipping from political to military hands. Without informing the White House, an Air Force general had moved SAC readiness from DEFCON-3 to DEFCON-2 (prepared for immediate action). DEFCON-1 was war. Kennedy was furious, and fearful that the situation was getting out of control. Afterwards, a "hot line" was installed for direct communication between the President and the Soviet Premier.
**In the "game" of brinkmanship, even though there are no winners in a nuclear war, the successful "player" must be able to risk losing one. The challenge, then, is trying to base a credible deterrent (massive retaliation) on an incredible act (mutual annihilation).
DCH 08/2000